Lula Is Reelected in Brazil: The Limits of Reformism and the Challenge Facing the Working Class

By Isabelino Montes

The electoral victory of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva over Flávio Bolsonaro once again places Brazil at the center of a political struggle that goes beyond the competition between two candidates. Lula’s comeback, securing more than 51.79% of the valid votes, reflects the mobilization of broad sectors of the electorate against the possibility of another government led by the Bolsonaro right. Voter participation in the runoff reached 80.78% of an electorate of approximately 159 million people, with an abstention rate of 19.22%, lower than that recorded in the first round.

The result represents an electoral defeat for Bolsonarismo and opens a new chapter in Brazil’s political struggle. However, for the working class, the significance of this victory cannot be measured solely by who occupies the presidency. It is necessary to examine the conditions under which it took place, the economic interests involved in the struggle over the state, and the limitations of a political project that, after more than two decades of the Workers’ Party (PT) presence in the structures of power, has still not transformed the fundamental relations of ownership and production underpinning Brazilian capitalism.

The electoral contest was also marked by allegations of U.S. interests interfering in Brazilian politics. Journalistic investigations reported that Donald Trump’s administration used funds exceeding one million dollars, administered by the State Department, to finance initiatives directed at reactionary candidates abroad, including a project related to Brazil. These allegations place the elections within a broader struggle over U.S. political and economic influence in Latin America, a region of strategic importance to its imperialist interests.

The allegations of foreign interference were accompanied by claims concerning the use of digital tools during Flávio Bolsonaro’s campaign. According to the reports cited, his campaign transferred 600,000 reais, equivalent to approximately $118,000–$120,000, to the U.S. cybersecurity company Elytron. Internal reports attributed to Meta employees also pointed to possible artificial restrictions on the reach of accounts favorable to Lula. At the same time, allegations emerged of advantages for pro-Bolsonaro profiles in the platform’s search results and easier approval of false advertisements and artificially manipulated content, including deepfakes, financed from abroad.

These allegations require distinguishing between documented facts and claims that still need independent corroboration. Nevertheless, they raise a fundamental political issue: electoral competition is shaped by the unequal distribution of economic resources, access to mass media, and the ability to influence the information received by the population. Formal equality at the ballot box does not eliminate the material differences between those who possess enormous financial resources and those who depend on their labor to make a living.

From a class perspective, these conditions challenge the idea that the electoral system, by itself, guarantees effective representation of popular interests. Money, corporate relationships, and influence over institutions can benefit certain sectors of the bourgeoisie while limiting the possibilities of those who lack such resources. Electoral competition does not take place outside existing power relations, but within a society where ownership and control of wealth remain concentrated.

However, this criticism should not lead us to ignore the immediate significance of Bolsonaro’s defeat. For workers facing deteriorating living conditions and right-wing policies, Lula’s victory may create room to defend rights and prevent setbacks. The problem arises when this immediate need becomes a permanent political strategy, with expectations of transformation placed in the government and negotiations between political parties, while the independent organization of the working class loses strength.

This is one of the central contradictions of Lulismo. Lula does not represent a threat to the existence of Brazilian capitalism as a system, even though his policies and alliances may come into conflict with certain sectors of domestic and U.S. capital. His governing record has been based on gradual reforms, income transfers, wage policies, and agreements with business sectors. This model allows for social improvements without necessarily changing the property relations that determine who controls production, investment, and economic resources.

For this reason, Lula’s victory must be analyzed from two dimensions. In the immediate sense, it represents an electoral defeat for the Bolsonaro right and may create more favorable conditions for defending certain social gains. At the structural level, it raises the question of why the PT’s prolonged presence in government has failed to eliminate the material foundations of inequality or prevent the right from retaining considerable power to contest political control.

The answer requires examining the living conditions of Brazil’s working class. During PT governments, measures were adopted that improved the incomes of impoverished sectors and expanded certain social policies. Cash-transfer programs, minimum wage increases, and employment policies contributed to partially changing income distribution. Recognizing these advances is necessary to understand why Lula retains popular support and why his victory represents an electoral alternative for those seeking to stop the right.

However, improvements in income do not mean that the capitalist relations producing inequality have disappeared. A portion of wealth can be redistributed through social policies without workers gaining control over major corporations, credit, investment, or productive resources. The state can address immediate needs while simultaneously preserving the conditions that allow capital owners to maintain control over the economy.

This contradiction is reflected in Brazil’s economic structure. Despite its enormous productive capacity, the country remains marked by precarious employment, insufficient creation of quality jobs, dependence on raw material exports, and concentrated wealth. Private ownership of vast tracts of land continues to benefit a landowning oligarchy whose historical position is tied to slavery and agrarian concentration. At the same time, major economic groups retain decisive influence over investment and productive priorities.

Inequality indicators help illustrate the persistence of these disparities. In 2024, the average income of Brazil’s wealthiest 10% was 13.4 times higher than that of the poorest 40%, while the income of the wealthiest 1% was equivalent to 36.2 times that of the same lower-income group. Although improvements in income distribution were recorded compared with previous periods, economic concentration remained profound. These figures show that the social gains achieved under certain governments have not eliminated material differences between classes.

Inequalities are also reflected in the conditions for participating in political life. Isolated communities whose residents must travel long distances to vote face material obstacles different from those encountered by people with greater resources and access to services. The right to vote formally exists for everyone, but the actual conditions for exercising that right are not equal. This reality helps us understand that inequality is not limited to income: it also shapes access to rights, services, and spaces where decisions are made.

In this context, the approval of a reduction in the workweek to 40 hours represents an important demand for Brazilian workers. After years of long working hours and wages that do not always cover family needs, reducing working time can represent a concrete improvement in living conditions. However, the need to fight for these measures also demonstrates that major labor demands remain unresolved after long periods of PT governments.

Reducing working hours, along with wage increases and social transfers, demonstrates that political struggle can produce concrete results within existing institutions. But it also requires distinguishing between securing better living conditions and transforming the economic relations that allow a minority to control social production. If the means of production remain privately owned and investment decisions are driven primarily by profitability, labor gains remain vulnerable to economic crises, fiscal adjustments, and shifts in the balance of political forces.

Capitalism can accommodate redistributive reforms without abandoning its ownership structure. It also needs to maintain a workforce available to enter the labor market, while part of the population remains unemployed or underemployed. From this perspective, social policies can alleviate real needs without eliminating the conditions that reproduce workers’ economic dependence.

The contradiction, therefore, is not that reforms lack value, but that their scope is conditioned by the economic structure in which they are implemented. When control over production, land, credit, and investment remains in private hands, improvements in income distribution do not necessarily change the bourgeoisie’s ability to determine the direction of the economy. The PT has demonstrated that capitalism can be administered through social policies, but its experience also reveals the limits of this strategy in transforming the material foundations of economic power.

This experience becomes even more relevant when examining the persistence of the Bolsonaro right. After years of PT presence in government, Bolsonaro and his allies managed to maintain a political base capable of contesting the presidency. Lula’s victory does not eliminate the conditions that allow these forces to mobilize support, nor does it guarantee that social gains will remain protected against future changes in government.

The limitations of reformism must therefore be examined in relation to the conditions that allow reactionary movements to reemerge. When the population’s needs do not find lasting solutions and reforms fail to transform the material foundations of inequality, social discontent can be exploited by conservative sectors. In times of crisis, these sectors resort to authoritarian rhetoric, mechanisms of ideological control, and repressive measures to defend their interests and weaken popular organization.

For this reason, stopping the right requires more than winning elections. It requires strengthening a social force capable of defending existing gains and challenging the economic conditions that reproduce inequality. The working class must participate in political life independently, without becoming subordinated to the electoral priorities of parties that administer the capitalist state.

The balance of forces in the Brazilian Congress makes this problem even more evident. In the October 2026 legislative elections, the PT did not lose seats, but it remained far from securing its own majority. The Liberal Party (PL), the main force of the Bolsonaro right, consolidated its position as the largest bloc in the Chamber of Deputies, while the forces grouped around the PT remained in the minority. The presidential victory, therefore, does not automatically translate into control of legislative institutions.

This composition forces Lula’s government to negotiate with the Centrão and sectors of the center and center-right to pass laws, budgets, and reforms. Business, agribusiness, conservative, and religious forces maintain a significant presence in Congress, limiting the government’s ability to advance certain redistributive measures. The result is a contradiction between the social expectations placed on Lula and the balance of forces that constrains his decisions.

The right thus retains the ability to exert pressure that does not depend exclusively on occupying the presidency. Although Bolsonarismo has suffered an electoral defeat, its representatives can obstruct government initiatives and defend economic interests that conflict with certain labor demands. This situation shows that winning control of the executive branch is not equivalent to controlling the entire state apparatus or transforming the power relations that sustain Brazilian capitalism.

Faced with this scenario, the PT once again relies on parliamentary alliances as a mechanism of governability. The problem for the working class emerges when these negotiations become the limit of its own political action. If workers’ organizations depend on agreements established by their representatives, their demands may become subordinated to the concessions those representatives are willing to negotiate with sectors of the bourgeoisie.

The PT’s experience helps us understand how this contradiction developed. The party emerged from a workers’ organizing experience with a significant democratic and anti-capitalist character. Its roots lie in the strikes in the ABC industrial region of São Paulo, in union mobilization, and in popular struggles that helped weaken the military dictatorship and open a new political period in Brazil. For many workers, that organization represented the possibility of building an independent political force capable of contesting power and transforming society.

However, as the PT consolidated itself as a governing party, it gradually shifted the center of its strategy toward electoral competition, state administration, and alliances with business sectors. The workers’ movement that contributed to its birth became increasingly conditioned by the demands of governability and the compromises required to maintain its presence within institutions.

Assemblies and grassroots democratic mechanisms lost centrality to party leadership structures and institutional negotiations. Workers’ control in the workplace was pushed aside in favor of strategies centered on wage bargaining, formal union representation, and electoral support for the PT. Although these tools have made concrete gains possible, they cannot replace workers’ ability to organize as an autonomous social force.

In this way, an organization born out of workers’ struggles became integrated into the structures of the capitalist state. The class consciousness that fueled the ABC strikes and the party’s formation did not disappear, but it became constrained by a strategy that prioritized institutional representation over the construction of independent working-class power. The PT’s transformation into a governing party thus altered the relationship between workers’ mobilization and the political decisions made in their name.

This trajectory helps explain why Brazil’s working class continues to face a dilemma between a right wing that threatens its gains and a reformism that offers partial advances without transforming the system’s economic foundations. Comparing these alternatives may explain electoral support for Lula, but it should not lead workers to abandon their own historic program.

The alternative is not to ignore the differences between governments or to dismiss the consequences of a right-wing victory. It is to understand that the immediate defense of labor and social rights must be accompanied by a strategy capable of overcoming political dependence on those who administer capitalism. The working class must defend its gains without giving up the struggle to transform the property and power relations that make those gains vulnerable.

This task requires rebuilding organization in workplaces and communities, strengthening assemblies, and developing democratic mechanisms of participation that allow workers to formulate their own demands. Struggles over wages, working hours, job security, and public services can become starting points for a common program that connects immediate needs with the structural transformation of society.

Strikes by oil workers, teachers, and metalworkers during Lula’s governments show that workers’ mobilization can maintain its own dynamic in relation to institutions. These experiences remind us that workers do not have to limit themselves to providing electoral support for a government and waiting for their representatives to solve their problems. They can also organize, exert direct pressure, and defend their living conditions from an independent position.

Recovering this organizational capacity is essential to ensure that Lula’s victory does not become reduced to another period of electoral expectations. Workers’ organizations must be able to support measures that benefit working people, challenge those that serve business interests, and maintain their own political agenda regardless of who occupies the presidency.

Furthermore, this perspective must go beyond national borders. Brazil has enormous productive capacity that could contribute to Latin America’s economic development if its resources were directed toward meeting social needs rather than exclusively toward private accumulation. Regional economic planning could coordinate productive forces, reduce certain external dependencies, and develop mechanisms of cooperation that serve workers’ interests.

This possibility requires challenging the capitalist organization of production, dependence on raw material exports, and private control over major economic resources. The issue is not merely to redistribute part of the wealth after it has been produced, but to contest who decides what is produced, how it is produced, and which social needs those resources should serve.

Building a socialist alternative therefore requires an independent political organization capable of connecting immediate struggles with a program of economic transformation. Social ownership of the means of production and the rational planning of productive forces would have to serve collective needs, with workers participating democratically in fundamental decisions. This perspective also requires developing ties among Latin American workers’ organizations to confront the interests of domestic and transnational capital in a coordinated manner.

Lula’s victory represents an opportunity to defeat the right electorally, defend certain social gains, and open spaces for popular mobilization. But its historical significance will also depend on the working class’s ability to learn from the contradictions of Lulismo and recover the political initiative that characterized the workers’ struggles that gave rise to the PT.

The comeback Brazil needs cannot be limited to Lula’s victory over Bolsonaro. It must also involve the recovery of class consciousness, independent organization, and workers’ ability to intervene directly in economic and political decisions. The defense of social gains and resistance to the right must become foundations for overcoming the limits of reformism, not reasons to perpetuate the working class’s subordination to the administration of capitalism.

The challenge is to transform electoral hope into permanent organization, mobilization into an independent political force, and immediate demands into a common working-class program. Only through this process will it be possible to contest control over the means of production, direct productive forces toward social needs, and develop Latin American cooperation capable of overcoming dependency and inequality.

Lula’s victory opens a new chapter in Brazil’s political struggle, but it does not, by itself, resolve the contradictions that run through society. The historic task of the working class remains the construction of an independent force capable of defending its gains without abandoning the struggle to transform the economic relations that reproduce its exploitation. The goal is not to turn the workers’ movement into an electoral arm of Lulismo, but to recover its capacity to contest economic and political power and advance toward building socialism based on the interests of the Brazilian and international working class.

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